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 In 1898 the United States declared war on Spain amid widespread support by the 
American public. Years before the United States had entered into the conflict, the broadly 
distributed “Yellow Press” newspapers had been drumming up support for American 
intervention in Spanish-controlled Cuba. The Cuban nationalist cause against Spain and the 
atrocities committed by Spain in response to the revolution were featured in the American papers 
since the mid 1890s. The explosion of the U.S.S. Maine in Havana on February 15, 1898, 
believed by most to be the work of the Spanish, turned the already enthusiastic public into one 
demanding of retribution, now not only for Cubans’ injustices but Americans’ as well.1 
 The war began in late April of 1898 and continued until August of the same year. The 
United States deployed troops to the island of Cuba and to Spain’s other imperial holdings. On 
April 24th Commodore George Dewey was ordered from his station in Hong Kong to the 
Philippine Islands, where the American fleet quickly won an overwhelming victory over the 
Spanish navy in the Battle of Manila Bay. With the help of Filipino nationalists American troops 
took Manila in late August. The first success of the Spanish-American War, accomplished with 
few American casualties, made Dewey a hero back home. 2 Heroes were also being made in 
Cuba. Theodore Roosevelt’s Rough Riders, a volunteer regiment, were famous both for their 
victory at the Battle of San Juan Hill and their embodiment of American manly and rustic ideals. 
With American military victories at both land and sea, in the Caribbean and Pacific, Spain 
																																																								
1 See John Tebbel, America’s Great Patriotic War with Spain: Mixed Motives, Lies, and Racism in 
Cuba and the Philippines, 1898-1915 (Manchester Center: Marshall Jones, 1996). Marcus M. Wilkerson, 
Public Opinion and the Spanish American War: A Study in War Propaganda (2nd ed.  New York: Russell 
& Russell, 1967). Bonnie M. Miller, From Liberation to Conquest (U. of Mass. Press, 2011).  
2 Long to Dewey, 4/24/98, Reel 3, William McKinley Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C.; Tebbel, America’s Great Patriotic War, 104-120. 
	 3	
conceded. Though disease ravaged the army in Cuba, the American public held on to the glory of 
the war rather than the horror.3 
The war with Spain was short and popular, but the complications of the peace settlement 
signed by Spain and the U.S. in December 1898 quickly changed the opinions and support of 
many Americans for the McKinley administration. By winning the short war, the U.S. gained the 
former Spanish territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines for $20 million and Cuba as 
a protectorate.4 While Puerto Rico quickly followed the path of other American territorial 
acquisitions, and Cuba was partially given the freedom promised her, a war began in the 
Philippines between the U.S. and the Philippine nationalists striving for their independence. In 
less than a year, the United States went from a power willing to use force against Spain to 
guarantee Cuba’s independence to one that used force to maintain the Philippines under 
American control. While Americans were wildly in favor of United States involvement in the 
Spanish-American War, there was a much more mixed response to the Philippine-American 
War. The peace treaty with Spain faced much opposition, and the senate did not ratify it until 
February 6th, 1899, and even then it only passed by one vote.5 “Anti-imperialists” and “pro-
expansionists” fervently fought for either granting the Philippines independence or continued 
United States occupation of the islands.6  
The Philippine-American War began in early February of 1899, when two American 
soldiers fired on Filipino insurgents while on patrol in Manila.7 The U.S. had used the help of 
Philippine nationalist leader Emilio Aguinaldo, later to be declared the first President of the 																																																								
3 “..the army suffers only 345 deaths from battle, 5,462 are victims of fever…” (in Cuba), Tebbel, 
America’s Great Patriotic War, 253, 305. Also see Gary Gerstle “Theodore Roosevelt and the Divided 
Character of American Nationalism,” Journal of American History (1999): 1280-1307.  
4 Tebbel, America’s Great Patriotic War, 328. 
5 Ibid., 336. 
6 See Richard E. Welch, Response to Imperialism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1979). 
7 Tebbel, America’s Great Patriotic War, 334-335. 
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Philippine Republic, to defeat the Spanish not six months previously. Now the United States was 
engaged in conflict with their old allies.8 The war that followed left the Philippines devastated, 
with over 100,000 civilians dead and much of the infrastructure and agriculture of the islands in 
ruins.9 The United States military suffered 7,000 combat casualties, with 4,200 of those being 
deaths.10 The true extent of the damages of the war did not reach the American public, though in 
1902 a Senate committee conducted an investigation into accusations of atrocities committed by 
American soldiers.11 The war in the Philippines officially lasted until 1902, when the United 
States replaced the military government with a civil one, but armed conflict between Filipinos 
and American forces continued. White supremacy and ideas about civilization featured heavily 
in the conflict, both on the front and at home. “The Philippine Question,” or what the United 
States policy in the Philippines should be, continued to be in contention throughout the early 
1900s, and was an issue in the 1900 and 1904 presidential elections.  
 In his article “Reluctant Liberator: Theodore Roosevelt's Philosophy of Self-Government 
and Preparation for Philippine Independence” Stephen Wertheim argues, amongst other things, 
that public opinion forced the imperialist President Theodore Roosevelt to begin a process of 
independence for the Philippine Islands. Showing that Roosevelt’s personal views contradicted 
administration policy, Wertheim seeks an explanation for the assertion in the 1908 State of the 
																																																								
8 Aguinaldo sent McKinley a Christmas present in 1898 and as late as December 28, 1898 the American 
Consul to the Philippines was reminding McKinley that Aguinaldo and the Filipinos were important allies 
against the Spanish. (O.F. Williams to McKinley, 12/26/98, Reel 5, William McKinley Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.) In January General Otis was 
communicating with Aguinaldo to try to maintain peace (Series of Military Messages from Otis, Corbin, 
Dewey, and McKinley, 1/8/99, Reel 5, William McKinley Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C.) 
9 Tebbel, America’s Great Patriotic War, 407. Richard Welch puts the Filipino noncombatant casualties 
at 200,000 (Response to Imperialism, 42). See Tebbel and Welch for more on Philippine-American War. 
10 Tebbel, America’s Great Patriotic War, 407. 
11 Welch, Response to Imperialism, 42. For more on atrocities see Richard Welch’s article “American 
Atrocities in the Philippines: The Indictment and the Response” (Pacific Historical Review, 1974).  
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Union that the Philippines would be granted independence “within a generation.” Wertheim 
states that, “domestic anti-imperialism triggered a profound change in Roosevelt’s thought” 
about American policy in the Philippines.12 
Though there was anti-imperial sentiment in the United States, there was also pro-
expansion sentiment. The public did not become more anti-imperialistic within Roosevelt’s 
administration. In this paper, I will examine the press, politics, morals, elections, and views on 
race and “the Monied interests,” as factors in public opinion that stayed consistent before and 
during Roosevelt’s years as president. With no public opinion polls to help gage Americans’ 
views, I have used contemporary newspaper articles and correspondence to William McKinley, 
Theodore Roosevelt, William Jennings Bryan, Albert J. Beveridge, and Joseph Benson Foraker 
to construct my argument.13  
Rather than anti-imperial sentiment increasing and being a factor in Roosevelt’s turn 
away from U.S. involvement in the Philippines, the interest in the debate over imperialism 
waned during this period. Roosevelt’s 1908 assertions about the Philippines in the State of the 
Union were consistent with past administration policy.  There was no drastic change in public 
opinion from the beginning of the “Philippine Question” to the end of Theodore Roosevelt’s 
presidency. While there continued to be both proponents and opponents on the issue of American 
territorial acquisitions, the importance of the issue and the force with which the two sides clashed 
faded. Factors influencing public opinion remained fairly constant, and the issue simply lost the 
attention of the American public. 
 																																																								
12 Stephen Wertheim, “Theodore Roosevelt’s Philosophy of Self-Government and Preparation for 
Philippine Independence” (Presidential Studies Quarterly 39.3, 2009), 516. 
13 I chose these politicians to try and maximize the number of letters and variety of opinion on the subject. 
All being players in the Philippine debate in some capacity, I hoped that their papers would reveal large 
numbers of constituents weighing in on the issue.   
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The Press 
One important factor in public opinion that remained consistent during this period was 
newspaper reporting. While newspapers continued to be influential and offer opinions about the 
issues, the information newspapers promoted was more even-keeled than during the Spanish 
American War, and so was the public’s response. Before and during the conflict with Spain, the 
newspapers circulated accounts of Spanish brutalities as well as speculation about the Spaniards’ 
future plans for the citizens of Cuba and the Philippines. The papers, particularly the New York 
papers The World, Journal, Sun, and Herald, not only disseminated information about injustices 
being committed against Cuban citizens, but also described injustices against American citizens 
in Cuba.14 The popular press’s enthusiasm for American intervention in Cuba and their widely 
publicized stories of the violence and injustice committed by the Spanish drummed up support 
for United States’ involvement abroad. In contrast, popular national newspapers did not commit 
to either a pro-expansion or anti-imperialist agenda during the Philippine-American War. While 
certain regional newspapers were vocal about their support or opposition of administration 
policy, there was no media circus surrounding the war. Both the content of the newspapers and 
the public’s reaction to them remained consistent from the end of the Spanish-American War 
through 1908.  
Unlike the mostly one-sided uproar from the Hearst papers before and during the war 
with Spain, the opinions being presented during the Philippine-American War were more neutral 
and varied. Many local newspapers were either pro-expansion or anti-imperialist depending on 
their support for the Republican or Democratic Party, and this stayed fairly consistent throughout 
the period. By just reading one local newspaper it would be possible for an individual to learn 
only one viewpoint on the subject, but the national press was varied enough that the information 																																																								
14 Wilkerson, Public Opinion and the Spanish American War, 35. 
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presented to the public was not nearly as one-sided as during the Spanish-American War. In 
1899 the San Francisco Call ran a large editorial section titled “Time to End the War in the 
Philippines,” with subheadings “The Failure of Otis to Grasp the Situation” (Otis at this time was 
the major general), and “The People Grow Weary of Slaughter.”15 On the pro-expansion side, the 
Atlanta paper The Sunny South in 1899 whole-heartedly backed the McKinley administration’s 
assertions that American good government in the Philippines would certainly help the country.16 
Other newspapers, like the Illinois paper Urbana Daily Courier, the Alabama Pratt City Herald, 
and the Iowa Fort Dodge Messenger had few editorials about the Philippines. In 1901 the Pratt 
City Herald ran a piece about the potential riches of the Philippines, but the rest of their stories 
regarding the Philippines conflict were limited to reports from the War Department and reprints 
of stories from national newspapers.17 While these papers did run stories about events occurring 
overseas, they were mostly wire transfers from national press sources, short, and lacking a clear 
political viewpoint.18  
This trend of either reporting from an anti-imperial or pro-expansion viewpoint or short 
articles focusing on events persisted throughout the period. In 1904 the San Francisco Call was 
still firmly on the anti-imperialist side, running an article praising the Democratic nominees and 
their support of Philippine Independence.19 In 1902 the Sunny South was still pushing the 																																																								
15 San Francisco Call, 6/18/1899, California Digital Newspaper Collection.  
16 The Sunny South, 2/11/1899, Atlanta Historic Newspapers.  
17 Pratt City Herald: “News From Distant Lands: Americans in the Philippines, Sweeping Everything 
Before Them” (3/18/1899, Birmingham Public Library Digital Collections); “Skirmishes in Philippines: 
robbers repulsed and pursued – 200 Spanish prisoners released,” “The Campaign in Luzon” (1/20/1900, 
Birmingham Public Library Digital Collections). 
18 Urbana Daily Courier: “Situation in Philippines: Bands of Raiders at Surigao, Mindanao, Practically 
Dispersed- And Other Points” (4/18/1903, Illinois Digital Newspaper Collections), “Fighting in the 
Philippines “ (3/20/1904, Illinois Digital Newspaper Collections), “Still Disorder in the Philippines” 
(12/13/1905, Illinois Digital Newspaper Collections). Fort Dodge Messenger: stories from Wall Street 
Journal, Fort Dodge Public Library. 
19 “Democratic nominee declares for gold standard, tariff revision and independence of Philippines.” San 
Francisco Call, 8/11/04, California Digital Newspaper Collection. 
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heroism of soldiers fighting in the Philippines and the economic opportunities available there.20 
The neutral Urbana Daily Courier in December of 1905 reported that there was “Still Disorder 
in the Philippines,” though nothing to really be concerned about.21 From the beginning of the 
Philippine-American War through Roosevelt’s 1908 State of the Union, local newspapers 
continued the same reporting trends.  
Unlike in their coverage of the Spanish-American War, the mainstream newspapers did 
not strongly back one side of the debate on the Philippine Question. While William Randolph 
Hearst’s papers strongly favored intervention in Cuba, they did not come out with a strong stance 
during the Philippine-American War. In an 1899 letter responding to William Jennings Bryan, 
Hearst confided that he was against Philippine independence and believed Filipinos should 
become citizens of the United States.22 While he was open with this viewpoint to Bryan, the 
Hearst papers did not use the same propaganda techniques used during the Spanish-American 
War to promote this viewpoint. Like local newspapers, “the nation’s leading periodicals were 
fairly evenly divided on… McKinley’s Philippine policy, though with editorial advocates 
probably enjoying a small majority.”23 Unlike the previous conflict, “the strident voices of 
Hearst and Pulitzer were strangely silent in this controversy…”24 
Though they were publishing fewer antagonistic articles, newspapers were still important 
to public opinion, and politicians understood their influence. The McKinley administration 
continued to be wary of what the newspapers were reporting and how the public would be 
																																																								
20The Sunny South: 5/10/1902 “Ranks of our Philippine Army Filled with Unknown Heroes,” 4/5/1902 
“American Capital Will Develop Philippine Mineral and Farming Interests,” Atlanta Historic 
Newspapers. 
21 Urbana Daily Courier, 12/13/1905, Illinois Digital Newspaper Collections. 
22 Hearst to Bryan, 1899, Box 23, Folder 17, William Jennings Bryan Papers, Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
23 Welch, Response to Imperialism,130. 
24 Tebbel, America’s Great Patriotic War, 310. 
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influenced by it. O.F. Williams, an American consul in the Philippines, wrote McKinley in late 
1898 stating, “… a yellow journal may thwart your plans- change a congress- bar army 
appropriations, resulting in disastrous and disgraceful failure in the Orient.”25 After the influence 
of the press in the Spanish-American War, the administration was concerned that they would 
take an active role in influencing the public on Philippine policy.  
Even in newspapers that did not come down against administration policy, there were 
reports on the atrocities taking place in the Philippines. In 1899 a soldier writing home from his 
station in Manila complained to his father that the newspapers were overreacting and making the 
violence of the war sounds worse than it was. “…The newspapers (inspired by some idiotic 
‘volunteer’ who had been ‘hitting the opium pipe’ and looking for notoriety) fume and ‘stamp 
about’ in supposed righteous indignation, and ‘demand the recall of General Otis.’”26 While the 
soldier felt that the attention was unwarranted, stories of American atrocities against Filipinos 
continued to be reported, and a Senate Investigatory Committee took up the issue in 1902. 
Roosevelt, in his 1902 State of the Union, addressed and admitted to wrongdoing by American 
forces, saying that, “…occasional instances of cruel retaliation occurred” during the war. Though 
“every effort has been made to prevent such cruelties” and the administration claimed that, 
“these efforts have been completely successful” in stopping such behavior, violence against 
Filipino citizens was reported through 1906.27 While some stories of atrocities did reach the 
United States public, many did not. Reporters in the Philippines complained of censorship by the 
military.28 Without newspapers reporting the atrocities that did get through the censors, public 
																																																								
25 O.F. Williams to McKinley, 12/28/98, Reel 5, William McKinley Papers, Manuscript Division, Library 
of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
26 Frank, an American soldier, to his father, 9/4/1899, Reel 8, William McKinley Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
27 Roosevelt, Annual Address 1902, Theodore-Roosevelt.com.  
28 Tebbel, America’s Great Patriotic War, 344. 
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concern might never have necessitated the administration admitting to wrongdoing by American 
soldiers. That being said, while there was an investigation in 1902, newspapers continued 
reporting atrocities without a significant uproar from the American public.  
The public, too, understood newspapers’ influence. However, many Americans were 
cautious of the information being presented to them. The sensational yellow press of the 
Spanish-American War made many Americans question the validity of news stories. While the 
newspapers were creating interest in the conflict with Spain, the American public did not 
wholeheartedly buy into all of the stories the press were publishing. The Vermont Standard, 
praising a politician’s matter of fact speech on the subject in 1898 said that, “the majority of 
people did not know how much was true and how much exaggeration” in the press.29 Similarly, 
during the Philippine-American War, the public felt that they could not fully trust the press. 
Writing in praise of Albert J. Beveridge’s pro-expansion speech about the Philippines in 1900, 
several supporters expressed similar sentiments. Enoch G. Hogate said that he felt like he could 
actually trust Beveridge’s statements as facts.30 W.M. Nelson, responding to the same speech, 
also stated that he felt like he could trust Beveridge.31 Though they still read and were influenced 
by the press, in some cases Americans turned to and trusted individuals more than the 
newspapers.  
This issue of trust could have stemmed from the unintentional misrepresentations printed 
by the newspapers. In 1905, the New York Times reported opposing stories within months of 
each other. In late January, they reported William Howard Taft as agreeing with the statement 
																																																								
29 Tebbel, America’s Great Patriotic War, 86.  
30 Enoch G. Hogate to Albert J. Beveridge, 1/10/1900, Box 127, Folder H, Albert J. Beveridge Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.  
31 W.M. Nelson to Albert J. Beveridge, 1/11/1900, Box 127, Folder N, Albert J. Beveridge Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
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that he  “believe[d] in granting self-government when the people are ready…”32 Then, not even 
three months later in March, they ran a story with the headline “TO RETAIN PHILIPPINES 
INDEFINITELY --- TAFT; Secretary of War Announces This as Administration's Policy.” The 
article was adapted from a letter Taft made public “in order to allay any misapprehension relative 
to the policy of the Administration with respect to the future of the Philippines.” While the 
article does not directly contradict his previous statements, it amends granting the Philippines 
self-government when they are ready to determining the future American course of action once 
Filipinos are capable of self-government.33  In addition to this inconsistent information from the 
administration, Americans were told from the beginning of the conflict that the war would be 
over in a short time. An 1899 article stated that in the opinion of one of Dewey’s commanders, 
“the trouble in the Philippines will not be of long duration.”34 Throughout the beginning of the 
20th century, the administration and newspaper headlines continued to promise that peace in the 
Philippines was right around the corner.35  In 1902, an editorial in the Washington Post poked 
fun at the administrations of Roosevelt and McKinley, saying that the war had been “brought to 
an end on six different occasions.”36 
During the Philippine-American War and the years following it, newspapers in the 
United States remained fairly consistent in their coverage of the situation in the Philippines. The 
only change in the newspapers seems to be a result of the lack of public interest. After the uproar 
over American atrocities in 1902, the interest in the Philippines lessened. Discussing the 
newspaper coverage after the 1902 senate investigation, Richard Welch states, “public concern 																																																								
32 The New York Times, 1/30/05, NYT Online Archive.  
33 The New York Times, 3/17/05. 
34 “DEWEY AND THE FILIPINOS; A Talk with Lieut. Commander Rees of the Admiral's Flagship,” 
The New York Times, 3/6/1899.   
35 Annual Address, 1902, 1905. 
36 Paul A. Kramer, "Race-Making and Colonial Violence in the U.S. Empire: The Philippine 
American War as Race War." Diplomatic History 30.2 (2006): 169-210. 
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did not disappear overnight, but it gradually fell victim to emotional fatigue and apathy.”37 While 
interest in the Philippine conflict and coverage in print media lessened, important news stories 
from the Philippines still made it to the national press. Even as late as 1906, stories of atrocities 
in the Philippines continued to make the news.38 The stories the newspapers were presenting still 
contained the same kind of information as they did 10 years previously, but rather than stirring 
anti-imperialist sentiment they were falling upon uninterested ears.  
 
Morals 
The moral obligations of the American public were continually called upon during the 
Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars, and the duties of Christian and patriotic 
Americans were invoked to support both the pro-expansion and anti-imperialist viewpoints. The 
importance of moral duty and sense of obligation on both sides were important factors in 
influencing how the public perceived the Philippine situation. Christian principles and patriotic 
actions were essential parts of many Americans’ identities, and these beliefs would not change 
over 10 years of debate.  
The sense of duty Americans felt and were asked to contemplate as Christians played an 
important role in shaping opinions. On the pro-expansion side, proponents of the 
administration’s Philippines policy argued that bringing civilization to the Filipinos was an act of 
Christian charity. In response to Albert J. Beveridge’s speech advocating for the United States’ 
control of the Philippines, an admirer wrote, “…it certainly makes plain our duty as a Christian 
nation, to our unfortunate brothers in the gateway to the Orient.”39 Advocates of an expansionist 																																																								
37 Welch, Response to Imperialism,145.  
38 Massacre of 900 Moro men, women, and children (Tebbel, American’s Great Patriotic War, 410). 
39 F.F. Drake to Albert J. Beveridge, 1/10/1900, Box 127, Folder D, Albert J. Beveridge Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
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policy also invoked the importance of missionary work in the Philippines, and the idea of a 
civilized, Christian nation saving a pagan, savage one was a common trope.40 Though, as 
William Jennings Bryan pointed out in a letter to Andrew Carnegie, many Filipinos were already 
Catholic from the centuries of Spanish colonial rule, the impression still persisted and added to 
the idea that Americans had a Christian duty to maintain control of the Philippines and “convert” 
the natives to civilized Christians.41  
Pro-expansionists also justified American control of the Philippines by appealing to the 
ideas of fate and destiny. This line of thinking was also employed during the Spanish-American 
War to justify intervention in Cuba. In an unsigned memo to the McKinley administration 
detailing reasons for intervention, the opening line reads, “God placed Cuba a segregated part of 
the Spanish realm, and distant from the parent Country, right next to our own shores.”42 The idea 
that God willed it that the U.S. occupation of the Philippines occurred, and that this was a sign 
that American control of the country should continue, was also used as justification for pro-
expansionists. In a letter to Beveridge, one pro-expansionist wrote that, “the hand of destiny is at 
work clearly pointing out to us our opportunity for the advancement of civilization and the basic 
principles upon which civilizations stands.”43 Destiny and fate, specifically the popular concept 
of Manifest Destiny, influenced and convinced pro-expansionists that their viewpoint was 
correct. In an 1898 letter to McKinley at the beginning of the Philippine question, a friend 
posited, “If we are equal to the demands of our Manifest Destiny, I see before this country a 																																																								
40 S.C. Campbell to Albert J. Beveridge, 1/11/1900, Box 127, Folder C, Albert J. Beveridge Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
41 William Jennings Bryan to Andrew Carnegie, 1/30/1899, Box 22, Folder 8, William Jennings Bryan 
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
42 Memo, 1898, Reel 3, William McKinley Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C. 
43 William R. Carwnie to Albert J. Beveridge, 1/11/1900, Box 127, Folder C, Albert J. Beveridge Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.  
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future such that our past could not suggest.”44 To many pro-expansionists, the Philippines were 
just another step in the American destiny to expand territory. The War and resistance of Filipinos 
were trials that had to be won, just like the Indian Wars of the American West, to spread 
American civilization and achieve the greatness designated by God. 
Anti-imperialists also used Christian morals to back their viewpoint. Rather than viewing 
the situation as an example of Christian charity or Manifest Destiny, they viewed the warfare and 
suppression of Filipino rights as anything but Christian. Anti-imperialists felt that Christian 
Americans should sympathize with the plights of the less fortunate Filipinos and attempt to stop 
their subjugation. A supporter congratulated William Jennings Bryan about his speech on anti-
imperialism, saying that is was “appealing to Christian conscience.”45 Americans with anti-
imperialist leanings also felt the Philippine situation called upon them to act as Christians, but 
against administration policy, not in favor of.   
Patriotism was also an important moral duty that shaped Americans’ opinions. Fresh 
from the “Great patriotic war with Spain,” Americans continued to place a high importance on 
patriotism and patriotic duty. Pro-expansionists called upon the duty of Americans to their 
president. The symbol of patriotism for many was the American flag, and those in favor of 
administration policy used this symbolism to help justify the Philippine policy and gain public 
support. Pro-expansionists felt that once the American flag was raised, it was Americans’ duty to 
honor and protect the place over which it flew. Wherever the American flag was raised was 
American land. Americans expressed that, “patriotic citizens believe in holding up the hands of 
																																																								
44 Frances Booker to William McKinley, Reel 3, William McKinley Papers, Manuscript Division, Library 
of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
45 George R. Wendling to William Jennings Bryan, 8/12/1900, Box 25, Folder 6, William Jennings Bryan 
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
	 15	
our heroic President and sustaining the flag wherever it floats.”46 The belief that “the people will 
rally to the support of the flag and the McKinley administration” was expressed by pro-
expansionists with conviction, as many believed support of the flag and the president was a 
patriotic duty.47  
Patriotism was also used as a reason to side with the anti-imperialists. Anti-imperialists 
felt that administration policy was anti-American. One supporter of Bryan felt that, “McKinley’s 
flagrant, heartless violation of the Declaration of Independence, his complete ignoring of the 
foundation principles upon which our republic is founded” was ruining the integrity of the 
United States.48 Another supporter expressed that he was “earnestly hoping as patriotic 
Americans, as we consider ourselves, that the present danger may pass without inflicting injury 
upon our national character …”49 For anti-imperialists, supporting the McKinley 
administration’s un-American policies was unpatriotic. In their view, the patriotic American was 
one who understood and defended the natural rights of the Filipinos. For the 1900 presidential 
campaign, Bryan staffers attempted to counter the McKinley administration’s use of the flag as a 
symbol of American patriotic necessity to keep the Philippines by changing the imagery 
associated with the flag. “This is the Flag of the Republic – not an Empire” and, “It shall wave 
over States, not Provinces – over Freemen, not Vassals” were two phrases they suggested as 
ways to convince Americans that supporting the administration was the wrong decision.50 
																																																								
46 Albert H. Bridgman to Albert J. Beveridge, 2/19/1900, Box 128, Folder B, Albert J. Beveridge Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
47 Charles Hernley to Albert J. Beveridge, 9/29/1898, Box 120, Folder 8, Albert J. Beveridge Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
48 Bennett to William Jennings Bryan, 9/21/1899, Box 23, Folder 10, William Jennings Bryan Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
49 Ralston and Siddons, Attorneys & Counselors at Law to William Jennings Bryan, 2/3/1899, Box 22, 
Folder 9, William Jennings Bryan Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
50 William J. Stone to William Jennings Bryan, 5/13/1900, Box 24, Folder 6, William Jennings Bryan 
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
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While duty to the Christian God and the United States were incredibly important to 
Americans, so was the idea of duty and responsibility itself. Having purchased the Philippines 
during the treaty with Spain, it was now the duty of the United States to produce a civilized and 
stable nation. Writing to Theodore Roosevelt in 1905, one constituent explained America’s duty 
in the Philippines by saying that, “having put our hands to the plow we will not turn back.”51  To 
a supporter of Beveridge, “the duty of the American-citizen regarding the Philippines is so 
clearly defined” that it seemed to the author to be written as though it were a commandment.52 
While the exact nature of the responsibility the United States had to the Filipinos depended on 
opinion, Americans felt that the disorder in the Philippines, caused both by Spanish and 
American policy and by the Philippine reaction to such policies, was the United States’ problem 
to solve. As Theodore Roosevelt often said, if anything was un-American it was the shirking of 
duties, and the United States had a duty to carry out in the Philippines.  
Christian morals, patriotism, and duty were all linked for Americans at the turn of the 
century. As one McKinley supporter wrote the president, “having once acquired control of the 
Philippines, many patriotic and intelligent Americans think that as a Christian people we cannot 
shirk from the responsibility of giving them good government and the advantages of 
civilization.”53 The importance of being a good dutiful Christian and a good dutiful patriot was 
paramount for many Americans, and this did not change during or after the Philippine-American 
War. People were either convinced one way or the other by arguments appealing to their 
patriotism or Christian conscience. Yet while morality was central for many Americans, it was 
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not enough to keep attention on the Philippine situation. The moral aspects of the Philippine 
question were important, but apparently not significant enough to combat the boredom that came 
with 10 years of the same debate.  
 
The Monied Interests  
Americans were concerned about the influence of the trusts and “The Monied Interests,” 
or corporations that influenced politics, throughout the time period. Both anti-imperialists and 
pro-expansionists were anxious about the sway that rich elites had over the administration’s 
actions. This domestic issue translated into concern about international policy, and remained a 
consistent apprehension for Americans.   
William Jennings Bryan received support for his anti-imperialist and anti-trust stances, 
and in many ways these two things were thought to go hand in hand. An advisor told Bryan in 
1899 that if, “you [Bryan] confine your talks to imperialism and trusts, you could carry New 
York, New Jersey and Connecticut on these issues in 1900…”54 A month later he further 
supported this opinion, saying that Bryan’s most popular stances were those on imperialism and 
trusts.55 Americans were wary of trusts and the “monied interests” in general during this time, 
and Roosevelt would become very popular for his “trust-busting” in the early 1900s. For some 
anti-imperialists, corporate influence in politics could be seen by the administration’s policies in 
the Philippines and Puerto Rico. Maintaining American control of the Philippines opened up 
business and trade opportunities in the Pacific, something the pro-expansionists cited as a benefit 
of administration policy. Anti-imperialists, however, felt that American corporations were 																																																								
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putting pressure on the administration for potential profits. In a criticism of McKinley, one Bryan 
supporter expressed McKinley’s “willingness… to put the dollar above the man” and “to carry 
out a scheme to rob a friendly people of their freedom, in order to satisfy a commercial spirit.”56 
One particularly fervent anti-imperialist wrote of a “nightmare of greed” and “satanic 
corporations” influencing the “murderous war on the Filipinos.”57 To anti-imperialists, the 
monied interests had influence over the administration and were a factor behind McKinley and 
Roosevelt’s policy of American involvement in the Philippines.  
Pro-expansionists, too, expressed concern over the wealthy’s influence on administration 
policy. Worry about undue influence by corporations became central to the issue of tariffs in 
America’s new territories. In 1900, a proposed tariff on Puerto Rico caused many Indianans to 
write to their Senator in alarm. While Albert J. Beveridge was an ardent pro-expansionist and so 
were many of his constituents, writers disagreed with the proposed Puerto Rico tariff because of 
both the principle of the tariff itself and the reasons they felt were behind it. Some Americans felt 
that establishing a tariff against Puerto Rico, allegedly an American territory like Arizona or 
New Mexico, was illogical and illegal.58 Their understanding was that the territories gained from 
the Spanish-American War would be just like those gained from the Mexican-American War. 
Americans felt that the trusts and protected industries were swaying the McKinley administration 
and congressmen to impose the illogical tariff to protect American sugar and tobacco 
																																																								
56 Bennett to William Jennings Bryan, 9/21/1899, Box 23, Folder 10, William Jennings Bryan Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
57 B.F. Spencer to Albert J. Beveridge, 1/??/1900, Box 127, Folder S, Albert J. Beveridge Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
58 Frederick O. Joss to Albert J. Beveridge, 3/13/1900, Box 125, Folder 10, Albert J. Beveridge Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Mark L. Dickson to Albert J. Beveridge, 
3/7/1900, Box 126, Folder 1, Albert J. Beveridge Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C. 
	 19	
companies.59 Discussing the tariff, one constituent expressed that “the people believe that there is 
something wrong in this proposition. That it is done in the interest of some trust, or body of men, 
or for the purpose of raising campaign funds, or some other thing that the people will not 
approve.”60 Another wrote to Beveridge saying that people believed the tariff to be about trusts, 
and that their representatives were answering to the trusts, and not their constituents.61 One 
writer told Beveridge that “almost to a man” everyone in Indiana was opposed to the tariff 
against Puerto Rico.62 The issue of the Puerto Rico tariff was so important to voters that advisors 
told Beveridge that if the tariff bill passed, the Republicans could lose Indiana in the upcoming 
election and jeopardize the legitimacy of the pro-expansion movement.63 The sentiments about 
tariffs were repeated when the question of tariffs against the Philippines arose, with the New 
York Times printing that, “it would be as just to establish a tariff between the states of Ohio and 
Pennsylvania as between the US and the Philippines.”64 
Americans’ concerns about the influence of trusts and other elites on international policy 
continued throughout the period, and this concern was something that the administration tried to 
combat. Theodore Roosevelt addressed the issues of tariffs and the monied interests in his 1902, 
1903, 1904, and 1905 State of the Unions.  In 1903 and 1905, Roosevelt called for the reduction 
of the tariff in place against the Philippines, and for there to be free trade between the islands and 
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the United States.65 He also addressed the issue of outside influences on administration 
decisions. In 1904 Roosevelt assured the public that he had “positively refused to permit any 
discrimination whatsoever for political reasons and have insisted that in choosing the public 
servants [for the Philippines] consideration should be paid solely to the worth of the men chosen 
and to the needs of the islands.”66  
The administration, while addressing public concerns about tariffs and outside influence 
on governmental decisions, also tried to calm the public’s distrust of the monied interests.  In his 
1905 State of the Union, Roosevelt addressed these concerns about corporate interests in terms 
of Philippine policy: 
Elsewhere in this message I have spoken strongly against the jealousy of mere wealth, 
and especially of corporate wealth as such. But it is particularly regrettable to allow any 
such jealousy to be developed when we are dealing either with our insular or with foreign 
affairs. The big corporation has achieved its present position in the business world simply 
because it is the most effective instrument in business competition. In foreign affairs we 
cannot afford to put our people at a disadvantage with their competitors by in any way 
discriminating against the efficiency of our business organizations. In the same way we 
cannot afford to allow our insular possessions to lag behind in industrial development 
from any twisted jealousy of business success.67 
 
Here Roosevelt sums up administration policy on corporate interests in the Philippines. He 
establishes the legality and fairness of big corporations (“The big corporation has achieved its 
present position…”) and then goes on to claim that any “jealousy” felt by Americans should not 
be allowed to limit companies’ involvement in the economic and industrial development of the 
Philippines. The Roosevelt administration understood Americans’ wariness of big companies 																																																								
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and tried to convince them of the necessity and legality of their involvement abroad. Like his 
trust policy, Roosevelt asked Americans to depend on him to determine good big business versus 
bad big business.  
 Suspicion about undue influence of corporations affected how Americans, both anti-
imperialist and pro-expansionist, viewed administration policy. Here the two sides of the debate 
agreed on an issue, and the Republican administration attempted to respond. Worry about the 
influence of “the monied interests” remained consistent throughout the period, and would not 
ultimately sway Roosevelt’s policies.  
 
Race 
Before and during the Spanish-American War, conceptions of race saturated the media. 
Spaniards were depicted as dark-skinned savages, and Cubans were presented as an infantilized 
people in need of saving.68 Similar thoughts carried over into the Philippine-American War and 
influenced how the public viewed the Philippines. Both anti-imperialists and pro-expansionists 
referred often to the race and general “otherness” of the Filipinos. White supremacy was 
ingrained in Americans, and the popularity of Social Darwinism helped to drive the public’s 
perception of the Philippine question. Americans’ views on race, something that certainly 
influenced perception about international territorial expansion, remained consistent during the 
debate over the Philippines.  
Newspaper stories and editorial cartoons help illustrate the various racial views 
Americans had about Filipinos. One popular view that was often promoted in the newspapers 
was that the Filipinos were violent savages, almost completely unrecognizable as human beings. 																																																								
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During the war, editorial cartoons portrayed Filipinos as dark, dirty, and monkey-like.69 A 1901 
newspaper article described Filipinos as near super-human monsters: “So ferocious are the 
natives that they may be shot through and through by a Krag-Jorgensen bullet, and yet they 
would fight for some time with unabated ferocity…”70 White Americans compared Filipinos to 
Black Americans, and the use of the n-word to describe Filipinos was widespread, especially in 
the army.71  Richard Welch bluntly summarizes Americans’ views on Filipinos: “If the 
American-born black man was judged incapable and so inferior, how much more ‘the Filipino 
nigger,’ for he was stunted, foreign, and rebellious.”72  
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   Charles Nelan, Cartoons of Our War with Spain, New York, 1898. 
 
While Filipinos were de-humanized as brutish savages, they were also infantilized. In an 
article titled “A Study of Philippine Nature” one scientist describes his findings on Filipinos. His 
ultimate conclusion was that “…we have this people on our hands to take care of, for it is evident 
that they are incapable of taking care of themselves.”73 Newspapers presented Filipinos’ 
brutishness as coming from their unintelligence.74 They also presented them as lazy and sinful, 
with one newspaper saying that, “the Indian of Manila is an indolent creature, given up to 
gambling and cock fighting.”75 The presentation of Filipinos as simultaneously child-like and 
monstrous was prominent in the newspapers, and Americans reinforced these ideas in their 
correspondence. People wrote to their congressmen about the “ignorant savages” in the islands, 																																																								
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and sustained the idea that they were not fit to govern themselves due at least in part to their 
innate racial inferiority.76 
American racial supremacy not only helped justify pro-expansion views, but also 
maintained the anti-imperialist opinion as well. Bryan himself stated that, “this nation, great as it 
is, cannot afford to do injustice to any race however distant or feeble.”77 David Starr Jordan, the 
president of Stanford University, wrote to Bryan that, “Lincoln once said, ‘If slavery is not 
wrong: nothing is wrong.’ If aggressive war is not wrong: nothing is wrong. If Imperialism, 
which involves both, is not wrong, nothing is wrong.”78 In the same letter, he also stated “the 
United States is in serious danger of the worst thing which can befall a free nation, the adoption 
of a system of colonies in which inferior races are ruled unwillingly for their own good and for 
the good of the captors.”79 Even ardent anti-imperialists were working from the mindset that 
Filipinos were inferior to Americans. While many anti-imperialists were concerned for the 
welfare of Filipinos, here Bryan and Jordan show more concern for the consequences that 
Philippine occupation would have on America than it would have on the Philippines. 
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Here an artist portrays Philippine President Emilio Aguinaldo as an unruly child.81 
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From the beginning of the conflict, the McKinley administration recognized the racially 
charged aspect of the Cuba and Philippine occupations. In 1898, a report on Cuba testified to the 
“ignorage of the natives” and referred to them as “poor deluded creatures.”81 The suggestion of 
the report was that the United States should retain “guardianship over them… for at least a few 
years to come.”82 Concern about the large number of black Cubans also surfaced in opinions to 
McKinley.83 One writer in 1901 attributed the “ignorance” of Cubans to the fact that they were 
“to a man negroes, or of mixed blood.”84 This same author suggested that, “these people are 
entirely incompetent to govern themselves and they know it.”85 This attitude about the racial 
inferiority of Cubans permeated administration correspondence about the Philippines as well. In 
1898, General Hastings submitted to McKinley the opinion that he questioned whether, “the US 
could satisfactorily govern such a medley of race, ignorance, brutality, and church power” that 
characterized the Philippines.86 The administration and pro-expansionists circulated that the 
United States was involved in the Philippines for “their own good,” and that they were incapable 
of self-government.87 These two things were explicitly linked to the racial inferiority of 
Filipinos.   
In 1900, General Wheeler wrote to McKinley describing the state of affairs in the 
Philippines, and brought up the issue of the use of racial slurs by U.S. soldiers. When discussing 
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the wariness that the non-combatants of the Philippines had towards American occupation, he 
said, “I regret that some of our officers adopt a bearing towards Filipinos which tends to 
strengthen this apprehension on their [the Filipinos] part. They call them “Niggers” and speak of 
them in a contemptuous manner, and I find that such talk is felt very keenly by the people.”88 
Wheeler continued, saying, “I think the offensive words about Filipinos are uttered generally by 
young and thoughtless officers, and an order from Headquarters forbidding such expressions 
would do much good.”89 This correspondence offers an interesting view of the administration’s 
thoughts on race relations. While the McKinley administration was fully participating in the 
white supremacy ideology of the day, at least one of their Generals recognized the harm this 
attitude did to the cause of Philippine occupation. The administration ultimately did not formally 
stop the pervasive use of racial slurs by US soldiers, but General Wheeler’s letter indicates a 
self-awareness to the racial thinking of the conflict and occupation.90 
As was the case during the struggles in the Western territories between Americans and 
Native Americans, the United States blamed the “lesser” and “savage” race for the violence of 
the Philippine conflict. When the atrocities taking place in the Philippines were brought to light, 
the administration attributed the violence to the savagery of the Filipino combatants and the 
Filipino Macabebe troops that were serving alongside American units. As historian Paul A. 
Kramer points out, atrocities committed by Americans were explained as cases where 
“‘civilized’ men might reluctantly adopt ‘savage’ methods to defeat savages.”91 Whether through 
claiming that American soldiers were only “emulating” Filipinos in the use of the water-cure 
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torture, or asserting that only the Macabebe scouts had performed the water-cure, the US army 
and administration again perpetuated formal, racialized thinking.92  
Americans’ views on the racial supremacy of Anglo-Americans and the inferiority of 
non-white races did not change from the beginning of the Spanish-American War through the 
Philippine-American War and American occupation of the Philippine islands.  The belief that 
other races were inferior to white Americans was a widely held, long-standing belief, both before 
and after the Philippine question. For the administration, pro-expansionists, and anti-imperialists, 
race was incorporated in their views of the conflict, whether it be to justify or oppose it. Ideas 
about race played an important role in the United States involvement in Cuba and the 
Philippines, and these complicated, ingrained notions of racial supremacy and inferiority could 
not change in the ten years that Americans debated the Philippine occupation.  
 
Theodore Roosevelt 
Theodore Roosevelt, president from McKinley’s assassination in September 1901 until 
the end of his first full term in 1908, had outspoken opinions on almost every subject. He clearly 
and repeatedly expressed his views on race, manliness, and the United States’ role on the 
international stage. Before the Spanish-American War, Roosevelt was a loud supporter of 
intervention, and he volunteered to fight once the conflict was under way. This enthusiasm did 
not carry over into the Philippine-American War. While Roosevelt’s own imperialistic leanings 
were evident, he did not fight to make the Philippines a permanent holding of the U.S. or to 
change McKinley’s proposal for the islands.  
Roosevelt’s own ideas about race were clearly defined, and it is hard to disconnect his 
views with the later Philippine war and occupation. Before the Spanish-American War brought 																																																								
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Cuba and the Philippines under U.S. control, Roosevelt had already laid out what he viewed as a 
struggle between “civilization” and “savagery” in his history The Winning of the West. The 
books detailed how Roosevelt viewed American westward expansion, and how Anglo-
Americans were destined to inherit the West because they were racially superior. To Roosevelt, 
the “race-forming” warfare against the Native American population in the Indian Wars of the 
19th century was essential to making Americans special and even more racially superior than 
other peoples.93 Roosevelt detailed every brutal act of violence committed by Native Americans, 
portraying them to be an innately savage race, compared to white Americans, whose violence 
“…proved them to be the…most advanced of races.”94 In the foreword to The Winning of the 
West, Roosevelt applied this argument to the Spanish control in the Western Hemisphere. 
Referring to the Spanish-American War, he stated that the “…expansion of 1898 was but a 
variant of the problem we had to solve at every stage of the great western movement.”95 The 
Spanish, just like the Native Americans, were a lesser race that needed to be expelled to make 
way for “national growth” and “national greatness.”96  
Roosevelt’s views on Native Americans and Spaniards could have applied to Filipinos as 
well. The struggle Roosevelt believed to exist between civilization and savagery was being 
played out again in the Philippines. Lieutenant General Nelson A. Miles compared the Philippine 
war to the earlier Indian Wars of the 19th century, and Roosevelt certainly would have seen the 
connection as well.97 In a speech in 1902, Roosevelt defined the Philippine-American War as 
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“the triumph of civilization over forces which stand for the black chaos of savagery and 
barbarism.”98 Roosevelt considered the Filipinos to be “latter-day Apaches,” and so the 
Philippine War could have become another struggle for civilization and Manifest Destiny, just 
like The Winning of the West.99  However, in his State of the Unions, Roosevelt made no such 
claims. His official updates on the situation in the Philippines focused on the creation of 
civilization in the islands, not the benefit of the experience for Anglo-American soldiers. Rather 
than conquering, Roosevelt declared, “Now we are civilizing the Indian.”100  
Other instances of international involvement during Roosevelt’s presidency further reveal 
his atypical response to the situation in the Philippines. In 1904 his comments regarding the role 
of the United States in Central and South America, known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the 
Monroe Doctrine, made clear his willingness to engage internationally as a “police power.” 
However, Roosevelt limited this intervention to the Western Hemisphere. While he briefly 
mentioned the United States “endeavoring to circumscribe the theater of war in the Far East,” the 
Philippines were not brought into the discussion. Roosevelt states that “chronic wrongdoing, or 
an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in 
America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation,” but fails to 
apply this logic to the Philippines situation. Roosevelt praises the intervention in Cuba, but 
chooses not to include the Philippines as another example of America’s rightful intervention in 
the name of liberty and civilization.101 While the Philippines does not fall under the jurisdiction 
of the Monroe Doctrine, it seems as though it would be mentioned in a discussion of intervention 
to create a stable, civilized society. While he was making promises to intervene in the Western 																																																								
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Hemisphere to guarantee civilization, Roosevelt sought to downplay the United States’ 
involvement in the Philippines for allegedly the same purpose.  
Roosevelt’s Papers contain relatively few items on the Philippine question compared to 
the issue of trusts, the 1902 Coal Strike, and Latin America. During the months following the 
Spanish-American War, McKinley received numerous letters discussing the Philippine Question. 
Personal friends, colleagues, newspapermen, and average American citizens wrote to him 
expressing their opinions on the issue. During his years in office, Roosevelt received many fewer 
letters regarding the Philippines. Those he did receive mostly dealt with administrative advice 
and correspondence from his Governor, Taft. Letters from constituents mostly dealt with specific 
concerns or general praise. A Catholic Bishop expressed that citizens were worried about the 
handling of Catholic churchmen in the Philippines.102 One woman wrote to Roosevelt 
concerning the “fallen women” of the Philippines.103 Those praising Roosevelt expressed general 
support for his policies and did not mention the Philippines specifically.104 For the most part, 
Roosevelt was hearing from advisors, fellow politicians, and a few concerned or admiring 
citizens. If he was hearing an overwhelming dissatisfaction amongst the American public 
concerning American involvement in the Philippines, it is not documented in his 
correspondences.   
Though Roosevelt believed that less civilized countries could and should be governed by 
civilized powers, he chose not argue for making the Philippines a permanent colony of the 
United States. Roosevelt had decided that Americans “do not desire to hold foreign 																																																								
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dependencies, and do believe in self-government for them," but it is unclear what was giving him 
this impression.105 Roosevelt argued for a reduction in the Philippine Tariff in 1907, but he 
lamented that "It is impossible to awaken any public interest in favor of giving [the Philippines] 
tariff advantages; it is very difficult to awaken any public interest in providing any adequate 
defense of the islands."106 Rather than an overwhelming anti-imperialist surge in opinion, 
Roosevelt struggled to interest Americans in changing tariff barriers, an issue that just seven 
years previously Beveridge’s constituents felt so strongly about that advisors worried the 
Republican Party would lose re-election in Indiana. More than anything, it seems as though 
Americans’ apathy, rather than widespread vocal opposition, of the United States “imperialist 
experiment” convinced Roosevelt to abandon any dreams of a permanent civilizing mission in 
the Philippines.   
 
Politics  
 Politics in many ways was central to the Philippine debate, as the pro-expansionists were 
backing the Republican administrations of William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, and the 
anti-imperialists in the early 1900s were associated with William Jennings Bryan and the 
Democrats.107 While generally viewed as a partisan issue, the support of the two factions was not 
as simple as Republican vs. Democrat. However, Democrats made anti-imperialism a part of 
their political platform. Even this national stage for the debate could not maintain the interest of 
American voters. The Philippine Question and its relation to politics was complicated, but it did 
not change from McKinley’s administration through the end of Roosevelt’s.  																																																								
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Though the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations clashed with Bryan and the 
Democrats, Pro-Expansion vs. Anti-Imperialism was not a strictly partisan issue. In 1900, many 
long-time Republicans wrote Democratic candidate William Jennings Bryan to express their 
agreement with his stance on imperialism. David Ferris, an 80-year-old man who had never 
voted for a Democrat, pledged his support to Bryan. After explaining his support for Lincoln and 
abolition in the 1860s he said, “Now I stand on the same ground yet again; but names have 
changed. I am still a Lincoln and a Sumner and a Seward Republican. A new issue has arisen. 
Our government of boasted liberty has gone into the atrocious business of conquest and 
subjugation of crushing out the aspirations for liberty of a weak people asking our friendship.” 
He added that he was “going to continue to vote the true Republican ticket by voting for Wm. J. 
Bryan for President.”108 Another Bryan supporter from Philadelphia intimated that, “I know 
many Republicans in this city who will cast their votes this year for the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution,” meaning votes for Bryan in the election of 1900.109 For the 
election of 1900, the issue of anti-imperialism was important enough to some Americans to 
change longstanding partisan voting patterns.  
It was not just those opposed to the administration’s Philippines policy who crossed long-
held party allegiances. Pro-expansion Democrats also expressed their willingness to vote 
Republican because of the Philippine issue. After his 1900 speech supporting American 
occupation of the Philippines, Senator Albert J. Beveridge received letters from Democrats 
expressing support. One Democrat, stressing his patriotism, admired Beveridge’s defense of the 
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administration’s policies.110 Even as late as 1908, a Democrat expressed great admiration for 
William McKinley, saying that he did not “expect to live long enough to see such an ideal 
President again.”111  
While the issue for many raised moral questions worthy of changing a lifetime of party 
loyalty, it still was considered a party issue for the elections of 1900, 1904, and 1908. The 
politics of the Philippine debate were not cut-and-dry, but they stayed consistent throughout the 
period. The victory of the Republican Party in all presidential elections during this period shows 
that the public was not expressing their dislike for US Philippine policy in great numbers through 
elections. The elections of 1900, 1904, and 1908 produced similar results. The popular vote for 
the McKinley vs. Bryan race of 1900 yielded 51.7% for McKinley and 45.5% for Bryan. In 
1904, Roosevelt earned 56.4% of the popular vote with the Democratic candidate Alton Parker 
trailing with 37.6%. In 1908, Roosevelt’s successor William Howard Taft won 51.6%, and Bryan 
received 43% of the popular vote in his final presidential election.112 While the exact percentages 
fluctuated, Americans were at least not voting more anti-imperialist as American occupation of 
the Philippines continued.   
In addition to consistency at the polls, the Philippines policy of the McKinley and 
Roosevelt administrations was unchanging from the beginning of the Philippine-American War 
until Roosevelt left office in 1908. The language in the State of the Union addresses to Congress 
about the plan for the Philippines was fixed from the beginning of US occupation to 1908. In 
1899, McKinley stated that he did not “recommend at this time a specific and final form of 
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government for these islands.”113 Once the “insurrection” abated, Congress would be tasked with 
creating “a permanent scheme of civil government.”114 In 1900, again McKinley expressed 
desire for “building up an enduring, self-supporting, and self-administering community in those 
far eastern seas.”115 After McKinley’s assassination, Roosevelt’s 1901 address spoke to the same 
goal: “We hope to do for them what has never before been done for any people of the tropics- -to 
make them fit for self-government after the fashion of the really free nations.”116 In 1902, 
Roosevelt announced that civil government had been introduced, and that “the people taken as a 
whole now enjoy a measure of self-government greater than that granted to any other Orientals 
by any foreign power…”117 He also warned of the dangers of moving too quickly towards self-
government, a caution he expressed continually throughout his years as president. In 1904, 
Roosevelt asserted that the Filipinos were not ready for self-government but stated that, “I firmly 
believe that we can help them to rise higher and higher in the scale of civilization and of capacity 
for self-government, and I most earnestly hope that in the end they will be able to stand, if not 
entirely alone, yet in some such relation to the United States as Cuba now stands.”118 In 1905 he 
again warned that, “If there has been any error as regards giving self-government in the 
Philippines it has been in the direction of giving it too quickly, not too slowly.”119 However, in 
1906 Roosevelt turned back to earlier language: “We are constantly increasing the measure of 
liberty accorded the islanders, and next spring, if conditions warrant, we shall take a great stride 
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forward in testing their capacity for self-government by summoning the first Filipino legislative 
assembly...”120  
In Roosevelt’s last address to Congress in 1908 his comments were mostly the same: 
“The Filipino people, through their officials, are… making real steps in the direction of self-
government.”121 He again stressed the danger of moving too quickly in the direction of 
Philippine independence, and suggested, “no one can prophesy the exact date when it will be 
wise to consider independence as a fixed and definite policy.”122 The one difference the 1908 
Address offered was the line: “I trust that within a generation the time will arrive when the 
Philippines can decide for themselves whether it is well for them to become independent, or to 
continue under the protection of a strong and disinterested power…”123 This “within a 
generation” might suggest a rough timeframe for independence, the first of its kind, if it were not 
followed by the exact sentiments expressed about the Philippines situation from 1899 on. Despite 
his personal beliefs, Roosevelt continued on the path to Philippine independence that McKinley 
outlined, however vaguely, in 1899.  
A few Americans might have been changing long-standing political affiliations because 
of the Philippine question, but the electoral and administrative outcomes on the issue were 
unchanging. In his 1899 State of the Union address to Congress, McKinley laid out the plan for 
eventual independence when the Filipinos were “ready” for self-government. Even Roosevelt’s 
imperialistic mindset and worries about moving too quickly did not dramatically alter 
McKinley’s plan for the Philippines. While eventual self-government with no timeline was 
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vague enough to have allowed Roosevelt to push back the creation of a civil government and 
Philippine legislature, Roosevelt chose to continue with McKinley’s course.  
 
 
Conclusion 
For Roosevelt to diverge from the plan laid down during McKinley’s administration, 
either to move more quickly to grant Philippine independence or to permanently secure the 
islands as an American colony, there would had to have been a call from the public for such a 
change. However, newspapers continued producing similar material on the subject, and while 
Americans were passionate in their views about morality, race, and the monied interests, none of 
these influences were significant enough for the public to maintain interest in the Philippine 
question. 
 Even before the end of the Philippine-American War in 1902, the number of letters sent 
to Roosevelt, Bryan, and Beveridge about the Philippines dropped significantly. As early as 
1902, as John Tebbel points out, Americans were “annoyed by the bitter arguments still going on 
in the newspapers and among politicians” and that “they wished the whole thing would just go 
away.”124 In 1906, the Anti-Imperialist League accused the American public of being a “partner 
in crime” to violence due to the apathetic response to the killings of hundreds of men, women, 
and children by American soldiers.125 In 1907, when Taft toured the U.S. he found “indifference 
amongst the people and the press” in regards to the Philippines.126 While some pro-expansionists 
and anti-imperialists still displayed the dedication they had at the end of the 19th century, for 
many Americans the issue simply faded from their interest. Rather than “domestic anti-																																																								
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imperialism trigger[ing] a profound change in Roosevelt’s thought,” as Stephen Wertheim 
claims, the opinions of Americans were not significant enough to force the Roosevelt 
administration to do anything other than play out the gradual self-government agenda laid down 
ten years previously.127  
 How did the apathy of the public influence future American decisions in the Philippines 
and in other international policies during the 20th century? McKinley and Roosevelt sought only 
for the United States to maintain the Philippines until they were “ready” for self-government, 
and within less than 10 years the U.S. established an elected Philippine Assembly. Yet the 
islands did not gain full independence until after World War II. Could the apathy that Roosevelt 
ran up against when trying to pass his tariffs have prevented future administrations from 
attempting to grant Philippine independence sooner?  
While the U.S. controlled the Philippines well into the 20th century, Roosevelt and future 
administrations did not seek to gain more territory. The rapid territorial expansion of the 19th 
century ended with the Philippines, and while the United States intervened militarily all over the 
world, the goals of such interventions were different and more clearly defined. The war and 
subsequent occupation of the Philippines was the United States’ only formal imperialist action 
resulting in an administrative colony.128 If the American public had shown more interest in the 																																																								
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Philippines, would Roosevelt have pushed for permanent occupation? While historians have 
deemed the “imperialist experiment” of the Philippines unsuccessful in accomplishing the goals 
of the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations, it is unclear whether or not public support could 
have outweighed the costs of war and the administrative headache to encourage future 
imperialist exploits.129  
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